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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a methodology to summarize the various policy pa-
rameters of an unemployment insurance scheme into a single generosity param-
eter. Unemployment insurance policies are multdimensional objects. They are
typically defined by waiting periods, eligibility duration, benefit levels and as-
set tests when eligible, which makes intertemporal or international comparisons
difficult. To make things worse, labor market conditions, such as the likelihood
and duration of unemployment matter when assessing the generosity of different
policies. We build a first model with such complex characteristics. Our model fea-
tures heterogeneous agents that are liquidity constrained but can self-insure. We
then build a second model that is similar, except that the unemployment insurance
is simpler: it is deprived of waiting periods and agents are eligible forever with
constant benefits. We then determine which level of benefits in this second model
makes agents indifferent between both unemployment insurance policies. We ap-
ply this strategy to the unemployment insurance program of the United Kingdom
and study how its generosity evolved over time.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: J65, E24
Keywords: unemployment insurance, labor market policy, measurement
1 Introduction
Because of their many dimensions, labor market policies are quite difficult to
compare through time and space. Their generosity is not easily measured by any
known aggregate statistic. Some programs can be restrictive in their access but
very supportive of those admitted, while others are open to all, but distribute pen-
nies. To make things worse, this generosity of labor market policies cannot be
assessed independently from the economic environment in which they are applied
at a given time. In a labor market with full employment, it does not really matter
whether support for the jobless is very restrictive. It would, however, in a world
in which unemployment is significant.
In this paper, we want to contribute to a better understanding of how gener-
ous, in an aggregate sense, some labor market policies are. We focus on unem-
ployment insurance [UI]. Specifically, we want to study how the generosity of
unemployment insurance has evolved in the United Kingdom by summarizing all
dimensions of this policy into one policy parameter. This methodology can be
used for other countries, thus ultimately also to compare different unemployment
insurance systems across the world.
Quite obviously, we are not the first who try to compare UI systems. Notable
recent predecessors are Martin (1996), Scruggs (2006) and Howell et al. (2007).
Martin (2006) summarizes a series of results from an OECD research program that
publishes international comparisons of UI coverages for various types of workers.
Pointwise comparisons of the many dimensions of various social programs can be
found in Scruggs (2006) for a specific type of household. Howell et al. (2007)
try to gather labor market institution indicators and aggregate them into a few
measures. These works, however, use little theory to discipline the indicators, as
pointed out by Heckman (2007). Also, they ignore how local labor market con-
ditions may matter. For example, whether the reduction of the eligibility period
for UI benefits matters depends on local unemployment duration. Thus while du-
ration of benefits is shorter in the United States than in most European countries,
it may not imply that UI programs in the United States are less generous since
the duration of unemployment is also shorter. US programs may even be more
generous in dimensions that matter more for local labor market.
Our approach is one of model-based measurement. We simulate a dynamic
general equilibrium model in which we confront two economies, one featuring the
complete characteristics of an actual UI program (that of the United Kingdom),
the other characterized by a one-dimensional UI program. This single dimension
is the level of UI benefits with no time limit or eligibility criterion other than not
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having a job offer. The metric by which we measure the overall generosity of an
unemployment insurance program is the level of benefits in the one-dimensional
UI program that makes agents indifferent between that and the actual program.
Our model is one of heterogeneous agents and stochastic employment opportuni-
ties in the spirit of Hansen and ˙Imrohorog˘lu (1992) and Pallage and Zimmermann
(2001, 2005). Agents can self-insure through asset building but face liquidity
constraints. There may be moral hazard in the sense that the UI agency may not
always be capable of filtering all those who fraudulously apply for benefits. We
consider this possibility in our sensitivity analyses.
With this methodology, our measurement captures the effect of possible changes
in labor market conditions. It also accounts for the fact that agents’ behavior will
likely respond to changes in UI policies or changes in the labor market. Finally,
our approach offers a unique way to identify the elements within the policy or the
environment that affect most the UI generosity.
Besides the methodological contribution, our paper establishes an important
empirical result: unlike commonly believed from a look at replacement rates or
from previous measurement attempts (e.g. Scruggs, 2006), the actual generosity
of the United Kingdom’s UI system has declined substantially and in a sustained
way since the 1980s.
In the next sections, we present the modeling strategy. We then calibrate our
model to the economy of the United Kingdom, paying special attention to the
households, the labor market and the UI policies. We perform simulations and
present their results in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Modeling strategy
We build two models, comparable in every element but one, the UI policy in
place. In the first model, there is a detailed unemployment insurance program,
with a vector of characteristics, replacement ratio, eligibility requirements, du-
ration of benefits, etc, that match those in place in the United Kingdom. In the
second model, the unemployment insurance is the simplest possible, specifying a
replacement ratio that is accessible to the jobless as long as they remain so, with-
out any further eligibility clauses. For exposition purposes, we want to start by
describing the common parts, i.e., the household problem.
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2.1 The household problem
We work within an economy with random job opportunities and indivisible labor.
Households care about consumption and leisure, which they choose optimally to
maximize an infinite stream of expected, discounted utilities. Savings can be used
to self-insure against adverse employment shocks, but there is no borrowing pos-
sibility. Every period, households enter an employment opportunity lottery. The
likelihood for households to be given a job offer depends on whether they had
such an offer the period before. In any case, households may choose to accept or
turn down a job opportunity. A publicly financed unemployment insurance pro-
gram provides some income replacement benefits to the unemployed under some
conditions. The UI agency operates with a balanced budget rule. Its revenues are
collected from income taxes.
The preferences of a typical household can be represented by the following
function
maxE0
∞∑
t=1
βtu(ct, lt)
where u(·) is a utility function with the usual properties, i.e. increasing in each
argument and concave; c stands for consumption, l for leisure: lt = 1 for someone
who does not work, lt = 1 − hˆ for someone who works an indivisible amount of
time hˆ; β ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor.
Savings m from a period to the next evolve in the following way:
mt+1 = mt + y
d
t − ct, mt ≥ 0 ∀t
where ydt , the disposable income can have one of three possible values:
ydt =


(1 − τ)y if employed (w = e)
(1 − τ)θy if eligible to UI (w = i)
(1 − τ)ψy if unemployed and not eligible (w = u)
where τ is the income tax rate used to raise the necessary revenue to finance
the unemployment insurance program and w is an indicator of UI labor market
status. There may be various indicators of eligibility for unemployment insurance
benefits. θ and ψ represent income replacement rates. We will call α the vector of
UI parameters that will be specified for each model below. Besides replacement
rates, α may also contain eligibility parameters such as waiting period, benefit
duration, asset tests, etc. For the time being, we will say that eligibility depends on
4
a vector of variables st that changes according to some, potentially endogenous,
law of motion /chi:
st+1 = χ(st)
The labor market is stochastic in the following sense. Job opportunities are
drawn from a lottery, following a simple binomial Markov process. The probabil-
ity to be given a job offer at time t depends on whether such offer was given at
t− 1.
To sum up the household problem, we can write it down in recursive form,
using a Bellman equation. For an agent with an employment offer, the relevant
Bellman equation is:
V (m, s, e;α) = max
{
maxm′ u(c, 1− hˆ) + β
∫
s′|e V (m
′, s′;α)d(s′|e),
maxm′ u(c, 1) + β
∫
s′|u V (m
′, s′;α)d(s′|u)
}
S.T. m′ = m+ yd(e;α)− c
m′ ≥ 0
s′ = χ(s)
It should be emphasized that when an agent turns down a job offer, he jumps
straight to state u (ineligible for UI).
In a similar fashion, the Bellman equation for an agent without a job offer can
be written as:
V (m, u, s;α) = max
m′
u(c, 1) + β
∫
s′|u
V (m′, s′;α)d(s′|u)
S.T. m′ = m+ yd(x;α)− c x = i or u
m′ ≥ 0
s′ = χ(s)
where the difference between UI eligible (x = i) and ineligible (x = u) is driven
by the law of motion of s and yields different disposable incomes.
2.2 Equilibrium
In this model, a steady-state equilibrium is an allocation of work, asset and con-
sumption for all agents, a value function v(·), a distribution of assets f(·), and a
tax rate τ such that:
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1. agents solve their individual intertemporal problems, given (α, τ) and labor
market characteristics;
2. the unemployment insurance agency balances its budget;
3. there is an invariant distribution of agents.
Under this definition of equilibrium, agents assume that the current unemploy-
ment insurance and labor market characteristics in any given period will remain
unchanged forever. One may question this myopic view of the world. An al-
ternative would be to take into account how agents are forward looking in these
dimensions as well, that is, how they look forward to changes in the parameters
of the UI system and how the unemployment rate and duration change. Model-
ing these expectations, however, is non-trivial. It would make the computation
of equilibrium several degrees more difficult, as it would no longer be possible
to rely on invariant distributions. We chose the easier path. We do not expect,
however, that such policy changes would matter much in terms of expectations, as
long as they are not large and are not announced long in advance.
2.3 The simplified UI program
We need to specify the rules that govern the simple UI program, its generosity and
eligibility criteria, i.e. α. For this simplified UI program, we assume that unem-
ployment benefits can be obtained immediately and that unemployed households
stay eligible as long as they remain without a job offer. If eligible, they receive
every period the same proportion θ of their income. An agent is ineligible as soon
as she turns down a job offer. In that case, she receives a fraction ψ of past income.
The simplified UI program thus has the following vector of parameters to
which we want to map the detailed UI program:
α = (θ, ψ).
2.4 The detailed UI program
Next, we want to describe the rules of a real world unemployment insurance pol-
icy in as many details as computationally feasible. Such policy typically has the
following components:
6
1. A waiting period a, before the end of which unemployed agents are not
eligible for full benefits, although there may be partial benefits in the mean-
time.
2. The duration of eligibility z, i.e., the number of periods an unemployed
agent is entitled to receive benefits.
3. The proportion of income that unemployed agents obtain as benefits, θ(j),
which may vary through the unemployment spell, including the waiting pe-
riod (j = 1, ..., z).
4. The proportion of income unemployed agents may receive after losing eli-
gibility, ψ, for example through other social programs.
The vector of policy parameters we need to calibrate from the data is therefore
given by:
α = (a, z, {θ(j)}j=1,...,z, ψ).
We can now turn to finding those policy parameters for the economy of inter-
est.
3 Parametrization to the United Kingdom
In this first exercise, we want to see how the generosity of the UI program, as sum-
marized by θ in the simplified setup, may change through time. For this purpose,
we use the characteristics of α for the United Kingdom for every year, along with
the relevant labor market data to parametrize the job-opportunity lottery.
The UK unemployment benefit system is summarized in Figures 1 and 2. It
was subject to major changes in the early 1980s.1 From 1966 to 1981, the UK
unemployment insurance system consisted of two tiers — a flat rate benefit and
an earnings-related benefit. Since 1982, the system consists of a single flat-rate
benefit, as it did before 1966.
Throughout the period examined in this paper (1972–2002), the flat rate bene-
fit, referred to as the “immediate benefit” in Figure 1, was payable after a waiting
period of three days, for up to 52 weeks. While it was in force through 1981, the
1A useful summary of the benefit conditions prior to the early 1980s is Atkinson and Mick-
lewright (1985) Chapter 2.
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earnings-related benefit was payable, on top of the flat rate benefit, for up to 26
weeks and after a 12-day (two-week) waiting period. “UI benefits” in Figure 1
refers to the combined flat-rate and earnings-related replacement rates for 1972-
1981. The “income support” replacement rate in Figure 1 refers to means-tested,
social assistance benefits which have existed under several different names over
the years. The means test changed over time as well and is shown as “asset test.”
All of the parameters in Figures 1 and 2 are based on the actual policies in
force for the years in question. All figures except for social assistance benefit re-
placement rates were taken from the summary data set of the Comparative Welfare
State Entitlement Data set (see Scruggs, 2005). Benefit replacement rates were
computed assuming a single-person household with net, in-work wages equal to
the average production worker (APW) in the year in which benefits were com-
puted. Benefit rates were based on those in place on April 15 of the year in ques-
tion. Benefit replacement rates assume a six month unemployment spell, with
the six-month total benefit annualized and divided by the net annual wage of the
APW. (Annualization facilitates the computation of income tax burdens.) Social
assistance replacement rates are taken from the United Kingdom’s Department of
Work and Pensions as reported in the Institute for Fiscal Studies (2006). Weekly
assistance rates (which are not taxable) were simply multiplied by 52 and divided
by the net APW wage. The asset test is based on the maximum allowable assets
divided by disposable APW.
The reform of 1982 did not just change the various benefits. Their tax treat-
ment also changed. Specifically, UI benefits became taxable in 1983, while in-
come support has never been taxable. As seen in Figure 1, taking into account
the tax treatment of benefits leads to the odd situation after the reform that UI
benefits were lower than income support. However, UI benefits are not means
tested, while income support is. Note that for this analysis, we used the effective
labor income tax rates published by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994), where we
complement the published numbers until 1996 with the update available on En-
rique Mendoza’s web page. After 1996, we assume no change in the tax rate. One
can reasonably argue that these tax rates are too high for our exercise: they are
defined as economy-wide average rates, and unemployed workers most likely pay
lower tax rates as their income is lower when unemployed and their base income
is lower than average. Thus we want to take the parametrizations with and without
tax considerations as upper and lower bounds in our measure of UI generosity.2
2Note that due to the endogenous response in self-insurance, tax benefits may lower our mea-
sure of generosity in some circumstances.
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To calibrate the job market lottery in our model, we make use of the fact that
in a binomial Markov process, the probability of receiving a job offer while unem-
ployed is the inverse of the unemployment duration. Furthermore, together with
the probability of getting a job offer while employed, it determines the unemploy-
ment rate Thus, we use time series for the unemployment rate and unemployment
duration to parametrize the odds of the lottery in each year. While the unem-
ployment rate is easily available from the United Kingdom’s Office of National
Statistics, duration data is another matter. We use data on inflows and outflows
of UI claimants, again from the ONS, but available only starting in 1989. For
the earlier years, we use the numbers published by Layard, Nickell and Jackman
(1991, p. 224). Clearly, we would prefer having durations for all unemployed
workers. However, using the unemployment rate along with claimant flows gives
us durations that should not lie too far from the truth. Atkinson and Micklewright
(1985) present evidence for the period 1972–1977 that there is no significant bias,
with unemployment duration averaging at 33.4 weeks, while claimant duration is
31.7 weeks. The unemployment rate and duration are presented in Figure 3.
The remaining parameters and functional forms are standard to the literature.
Following Hansen and ˙Imrohorog˘lu (1992) and the literature that followed, we let
the utility function be
u(c, l) =
(c1−σlσ)1−γ
1 − γ
− 1
with σ = 0.67 and γ = 2.5. Leisure l is one when unemployed and 0.55
when working. Also, we set the discount factor β such that it corresponds to a
discount rate of 4% per year. When running the simulations, we consider the
time frequency to be weekly. Such a high frequency is necessary to capture key
features of the United Kingdom’s UI policy. The eligibility waiting period is one
week for part of our sample.
4 Results
Our solution algorithm is as follows. We first solve numerically the model with
the detailed UI program for each year in the sample. This is performed by trans-
forming the state space, in particular assets m, into a grid, then using discrete
dynamic programming techniques to obtain a solution through iterations on the
value function. Given the resulting value function and invariant distribution of
agent types, we can obtain the expected value of a UI program, call it W .
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The next step implies solving the model with the simplified UI program using
the same technique. We search through various values of θ until we find the one
that provides the expected value closest to W . This is done for every year in our
1972–2002 sample, thereby giving us the path of UI generosity over time.
Note that the value function of the simplified economy in non-monotonic in
θ. Indeed, with θ = 0, individuals must bear their employment risk completely
and need to self-insure through asset accumulation, which is costly. With θ = 1,
income in completely insured, but because agents also value leisure they would
actually prefer a lower θ, as θ = 1 implies that being unemployed is better than
being employed. Also, high θ implies higher taxes. Therefore, there is an optimal
θ somewhere in between, and it is unlikely that this optimal θ corresponds to
the one we find in the simulation. This means that for any value W we try to
match, there are two corresponding θ, as for tax rates in a Laffer curve. In our
simulations, one of those two replacement rates always has an unreasonable value
(above 100%...).3 We pick the reasonable one.
Note that it is theoretically possible for the complex economy to attain a value
that is unreachable by the simple one. For example, if the complex economy
has features like those described in Shavell and Weiss (1979) or Hopenhayn and
Nicollini (1997), where benefits are optimized as they vary over the unemploy-
ment spell or thereafter. While in our experience so far it has not been a problem,
it could be one in more generous UI systems than the one studied here.
Our simulated θ is presented in Figure 4. The figure shows that unemployment
insurance became dramatically less generous in the early 1980’s and this trend
has continued since. Such a results is not self-evident from the parametrization.
While indeed progam benefits declined in a similar fashion, the waiting period
was reduced and the eligibility to UI was lengthened. It turns out the latter is
inconsequential in conjunction with the changes in the labor market. We also
notice that our simulated benefits are most of the time significantly below the
program UI benefits. The restrictions to eligibility thus have a significant impact.
Finally, simulated benefits are much more variable, reflecting the changing labor
market conditions as well as the other program parameters. Also, early in the
sample, some of the variability is due to the fact that generosity was closer to a
social optimum, and thus was in a flatter portion of the average value function.
These various influences can be disentangled, but let us first have a look at an
alternative measure of generosity. A “naive” and much simpler way to proceed
3Note that a negative value may not be inconceivable for low UI benefits and tight asset tests
for various benefits, due to the endogenous response in asset accumulation.
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would be to compute the present value of benefits under the current system and
compute the corresponding “permanent income,” θ:
a∑
t=1
βt−1θt +
a+z∑
t=a+1
βt−1θt +
∞∑
t=a+z+1
βt−1ψ =
1
1 − β
θ.
Now compare this naive θ to the simulated θ we obtained before in Figure
5. While the naive θ would have recognized a decline in UI generosity, it would
have in no way registered the huge decrease in the early eighties. Several factors
contribute to this mismeasurement: The naive measure does not take into account
changes in the labor market, ignores means tests, and it does not factor in how
workers’ behavior changed in terms of self-insurance. In particular, the naive
measure displays even less of a decline than the program UI benefits.
What influences our generosity measure? There are two ways to determine
this: by regressing it on its determinants, and by performing counterfactual anal-
yses. Table 1 displays the results of the regression. Obviously, this exercise is
full of flaws, starting with the small sample and correlated explanatory variables.
But the fact that the interval on the coefficients is very large highlights that the
relationships may not be linear. Also, some variables could have a large impact.
The last column describes the change in generosity resulting from the smallest to
the largest value in the sample. We see that quite expectedly UI benefits have a
strong impact, but so do wait times, the unemployment rate and unemployment
duration, and to a lesser extend the other program variables.
We believe, however, that the proper way to evaluate the impact of the program
variables and the labor market conditions is through counterfactuals using our
model. The idea here is to run the same simulations as before, but with modified
variables. In Figures 6 to 13, we look in turn at each variable, whereby the variable
is set at its average value in the sample. Thus, any difference with the benchmark
simulation is due to variations in the variable at hand, variations that incorporate
the endogenous responses of the model households.
Take Figure 6. Here, the unemployment rate is set for the whole sample period
to its average value of 7.46%. While the unemployment rate does not seem to
affect the general downward trend of generosity, it seems to affect some of its
variablity, in particular in the latter sample period. The reverse is true for UI
benefits: they clearly explain the trend in generosity, but not variability (Figure
7).
Looking further at other variables, unemployment duration affects somewhat
the variability of generosity (Figure 8), and wait times have virtually no impact
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(Figure 9). Figure 10 shows benefit duration during the last seven years lasting as
long as before the reform, i.e. 52 instead of 26 weeks. Generosity increases, but
relatively little. Changes in incomes security affect outcomes about as much as
several of the other variables did (Figure 11). The impact of tax benefits for unem-
ployed workers is more substantial, see Figure 12. Interestingly, for recent years,
removing tax benefits improves generosity through the endogenous response of
households who self-insure more and thus rely less on unemployment insurance.
Finally, we see on Figure 13 that the introduction of asset tests that were truly
binding has had a substantial impact, in particular during the early eighties when
benefits were more generous than today.
All in all, these counterfactual experiments show that, except for the wait pe-
riod, all changes in labor market conditions and program parameters have a mea-
surable impact on program generosity. It is therefore important to take them all
into account for any evaluation of the generosity of an unemployment insurance
system.
Other parameter values that are not related to the unemployment insurance
program or the labor market conditions, such as risk aversion or the discount rate,
may also influence our measure of generosity. However, as a modification of such
a parameter value would affect both the complex and the simple model economies,
the impact is moderate. The strongest impact comes from a change in the risk
aversion parameter, as shown in Figure 14.
Moral hazard may also have an impact, as workers may choose to shirk dif-
ferently, depending on the generosity of the system. But as the generosity would
be comparable, by definition, in the complex and simple model economies, this
should only have a negligible impact, unless there are some very strong amplifica-
tion mechanisms in play with asset accumulation. When amending the model with
the possibility of moral hazard much in the same way as Hansen and ˙Imrohorog˘lu
(1992) and Pallage and Zimmermann (2001), we find that workers do not bother
to shirk as the UI system is not sufficiently generous in the case of the UK.
5 Conclusion
We view the main contribution of this paper as methodological. We develop a
method to determine a comparable one-dimensional measure the level of gen-
erosity of a social program, in our case the unemployment insurance, based on
a micro-founded model. Specifically, we draw a model where heterogeneous
agents face labor market shocks, react by accumulating assets and use a multi-
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dimensional UI system. We then determine how generous a one-dimensional UI
system needs to be for agents to be indifferent between the two.
Our second contribution is empirical. Parametrizing our model economies
to the period 1972–2002 in the United Kingdom, we find dramatic drops in the
generosity in the early 1980’s despite more generous UI eligibility. Since then,
generosity of unemployment insurance in the UK has continued to decline. We
show that the severity of this drop would not have been captured by a measure
of generosity that would have focused solely on the parameters of the system,
thereby ignoring the changing labor market and the reactions of the agents.
The methodology we have presented here can be applied in many ways. For
example, it makes international comparisons of unemployment insurance or other
social programs possible.
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Table 1: Regression of simulated θ on parameters
Parameter coefficient 95% interval impact on θ
Constant 0.370 -0.104 0.844 0.000
Immediate benefit -0.475 -3.295 2.345 -0.070
UI benefit 2.624 0.668 4.580 0.842
Income support -0.628 -2.716 1.459 -0.072
Asset test 0.058 -0.091 0.208 0.051
Wait time -0.243 -0.472 -0.013 -0.364
UI duration -0.002 -0.006 0.001 -0.058
Unemployment rate -2.023 -5.880 1.834 -0.164
Unemployment duration 0.010 -0.001 -0.021 0.326
Tax -1.307 -3.713 1.099 -0.073
Figure 1:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
%
Program benefit parameters, as % of average income, with tax benefits
 
 
immediate benefits
UI benefits
income support
asset test
15
Figure 2:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
w
e
e
ks
Program eligibility parameters, in weeks
 
 
waiting period
UI eligibility period
Figure 3:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
, w
ee
ks
Labor market parameters
 
 
unemployment rate
unemployment duration
16
Figure 4:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
Effective UI coverage in simulated economies
 
 
simulated benefits
UI benefits
Figure 5:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
Comparison of simulated and naive effective UI coverage with tax benefits
 
 
naive
simulated
17
Figure 6:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
Robustness tests on UI coverage
 
 
average unemployment
benchmark
Figure 7:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
Robustness tests on UI coverage
 
 
average benefits
benchmark
18
Figure 8:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
%
Robustness tests on UI coverage
 
 
av. unemp duration
benchmark
Figure 9:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
Robustness tests on UI coverage
 
 
constant wait time
benchmark
19
Figure 10:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
Robustness tests on UI coverage
 
 
constant benefit duration
benchmark
Figure 11:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
Robustness tests on UI coverage
 
 
average income security
benchmark
20
Figure 12:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
Robustness tests on tax benefits
 
 
no benefits
with benefits (benchmark)
Figure 13:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
%
Robustness tests on UI coverage on asset test
 
 
no asset test
benchmark
21
Figure 14:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
%
Robustness tests on risk aversion
 
 
ρ=1.5
ρ=2.5 (benchmark)
22
